τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι – Parmenides
In his latest book, All Things Are Full of Gods, David Bentley Hart explains why Neoplatonism is the only logical solution to several issues in the humanities. While I am neither a philosopher nor an academic, I would like to share my thoughts on this work. This text is somewhere between a summary and a review. Since I believe the book deserves more attention, here are my reflections.
The book is written as a classical Platonic dialogue. Hart introduces four characters: Hermes (language), Eros (desire), Psyche (reason), and Hephaistos (the sceptic). These characters symbolize different ways of thinking and engage in a lively and profound discussion on the nature of consciousness and reality. For most of the book, the dialogue is primarily between Psyche and Hephaistos.
The central idea of the book is that consciousness is more fundamental than matter. The notion that consciousness is more fundamental than matter may seem eccentric at first glance. It evokes Berkeley’s idealism or even panpsychism. However, Hart does not deny the existence of matter; rather, he strongly opposes the idea that the mind can be reduced to lifeless matter, as advocated by figures like Daniel Dennett in From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds.
A central argument in All Things Are Full of Gods is that consciousness undeniably exists because people have experiences—in philosophical terms, because qualia exist. Qualia are the subjective experiences that shape our world-view, such as seeing the red colour of a rose or tasting a sweet fruit. Hart argues that qualia, by their nature, cannot be reduced to purely material processes.
According to Hart, this is a crucial response to what David Chalmers calls the “hard problem of consciousness”: how physical processes in the brain can produce subjective experience. The existence of qualia is not only evidence of consciousness but also proof that consciousness is the fundamental property of reality. In other words: matter does not produce consciousness, but consciousness produces matter. This, he claims, is the only coherent solution to this philosophical problem.
In the chapters that follow, various materialist alternatives are examined.
Consciousness as an Emergent Phenomenon
Hephaistos argues that consciousness arises from complexity, much like how new possibilities emerge in a computer as technology advances. Psyche finds emergence a vague and inadequate concept. It does not explain how complexity produces consciousness. Psyche compares it to a computer: a computer does not run software without a designer, programmer, and user. Emergence cannot simply “explain” the existence of consciousness without invoking an external, intentional source (like the designer). The concept raises more questions than it answers. Hart refers to Nancy Cartwright to emphasize the need for an actual explanation rather than mere descriptions.
Identity Theory
According to identity theory, mental phenomena are essentially identical to physical processes, much like the Evening Star and the Morning Star ultimately turned out to be the same object (Venus). Psyche argues that this idea falls short because mental phenomena behave fundamentally differently from physical processes. Mental phenomena, such as consciousness, are only accessible through a first-person perspective, while physical processes are described from a third-person perspective. These two perspectives cannot be seamlessly reconciled. Mental experiences are, by definition, not measurable in the same way as physical processes, revealing a significant gap in identity theory.
Eliminativism
Eliminativism, as proposed by Rorty, goes even further. It claims that concepts such as “consciousness” and “intentions” are misleading and actually do not exist. According to this view, everything can be reduced to biochemical and physiological processes, and mental concepts are merely “folk psychology.”
Psyche finds eliminativism childish and ridiculous for several reasons. She points out that this perspective wrongly assumes that everything must be reducible to physics, which reflects a dogmatic and unscientific attitude. Moreover, she notes that eliminativism contains a circular argument: it dismisses mental phenomena simply because they do not fit into physics, without providing further evidence. Psyche does acknowledge that eliminativism, absurd as it may be, is the only logically coherent option within a strictly physicalist world-view. But she argues that it is precisely this world-view that is flawed and in need of renewal.
Epiphenomenalism
Hephaistos asserts that consciousness is a completely ineffective by-product of physical processes. For example, if I am thirsty and drink water, my “intention” to drink water is an illusion. My body performs physical actions based on signals, while my sense of conscious choice is merely a passive by-product.
Psyche calls this an absurd theory, stemming once again from the dogma that all physical events are determined solely by physical causes (causal closure of the physical, CCP). There is no evidence to support the claim that consciousness does nothing. On the contrary, the fact that I can consciously choose how to interpret an optical illusion demonstrates that consciousness is active and effective. If feeling pain and reacting reflexively had nothing to do with consciousness, there would be no reason for consciousness to exist at all. Epiphenomenalism thus falls short because it cannot explain why consciousness exists in the first place.
Supervenience
Supervenience posits that mental states depend on but do not directly influence physical states. In other words, a thought can only cause another thought if the underlying physical processes cause the corresponding physical processes of the next thought.
Psyche and Hermes point out that this model is ultimately a variant of epiphenomenalism. If mental and physical states are entirely dependent on physical processes, it remains unexplained how consciousness exhibits properties that are irreducible to physics, such as intentionality and subjectivity. If there is a scientific law that connects mind and matter, it necessarily leads to emergence—a concept that, as David Bentley Hart previously argued, is internally contradictory. If the connection between mind and matter is purely coincidental, consciousness becomes a mystery that materialism cannot explain. Supervenience thus fails to offer a coherent solution.
Psychological Plurality
Hephaistos points to experiments in which the left and right hemispheres of the brain were disconnected, leading to two seemingly independent “minds.” He argues that this proves that consciousness is not an indivisible whole but arises from brain activity and is therefore physical.
Psyche acknowledges that these experiments are interesting but argues that they do not prove that consciousness is purely physical. The situation in which the brain hemispheres function separately changes the conditions under which consciousness is expressed but explains nothing about its origin. Moreover, both hemispheres continue to exhibit meaningful conscious experience, suggesting that consciousness is more flexible and non-local than strictly tied to physical structures.
Function and Knowledge
The idea of a Cartesian theatre—an inner observer that watches our thoughts and experiences—is rejected by Daniel Dennett. According to Dennett, there is no “observing self”; consciousness is merely the result of brain processes in which neurons transmit signals and collectively perform functions. This so-called inner “self” is nothing more than a functional aggregate. Similarly, qualia—the subjective experiences of things like pain or colours—are, according to Dennett, not mystical properties but rather habits by which our brains interpret sensory impressions within a specific context.
An example is the phenomenon of pain. According to Dennett, pain has an evolutionary function: it warns us of danger and promotes survival behaviour. Thus, we do not experience pain because it inherently “exists” but because it serves as a useful function generated by our brains.
Dennett uses the coffee argument—where two individuals perceive different tastes in their coffee and wonder whether the change is in the coffee or in their own taste perception—to argue that qualia do not truly exist but are merely interpretations within a functional framework.
David Bentley Hart, on the other hand, points to the knowledge argument, in which someone who has lived their entire life in a black-and-white room experiences colours for the first time, gaining knowledge that cannot be reduced to abstract information. From this, he concludes that qualia do indeed exist and are irreducible to physical processes.
Conclusion
David Bentley Hart’s All Things Are Full of Gods is a defence of the idea that consciousness is the fundamental basis of reality, rather than merely a by-product of material processes. Through his Neoplatonic perspective, Hart positions himself against dominant materialist and reductionist approaches in contemporary philosophy of mind. Hart’s arguments are not only philosophically challenging but also culturally relevant. In an era where reductionism is often presented as the inevitable conclusion of scientific progress, he reminds us that science offers a limited perspective on reality. All Things Are Full of Gods is a philosophical invitation to reconsider the foundation of consciousness and reality and a call to rethink the fundamentals of our understanding.